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NOTES
Bankruptcy-Creditors' Rights-A Bona Fide Purchaser-Plus Test for
Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy
Congress, under constitutional mandate to provide "uniform law's
on the subject of bankruptcies,"' has in recent decades responded period-
Jcally2 to the threat to national uniformity and federal preemption posed
by state-created creditors' rights. These threats most commonly take the
form of "statutory liens" which, if unrestricted, could soon have a
greater impact on the administration of bankrupt estates than the Bank-
ruptcy Act itself.' The difficulty of imposing satisfactory restrictions on
statutory liens is indicated as much by the dramatic character of the
changes made as by the frequency with which Congress has felt the need
to make them. A recent court of appeals decision, In re J.R. Nieves &
Co.,5 has cast into high relief some problems inherent in the latest statu-
tory scheme. In addition, the holding in the case portends consequences
of the 1966 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act beyond the probable
contemplation of their draftsmen.'
Section 67c of the Bankruptcy Act regulates the validity of statu-
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, 66 Stat. 420; Act of
July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89495, 80 Stat. 268.
3A statutory lien in common understanding is a lien which is given by statute to protect a
particular economic class, such as mechanics or tax claimants, and which is in no way dependent
on judicial proceedings or conse'nsual security transactions. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
67.12[5], at 155, & 67.20[9], at 253 (14th ed. J. Moore & L. King 1968) [hereinafter cited as
COLLIER].
A statutory lien is defined by Bankruptcy Act § 1(29a), I I U.S.C. § 1(29a) (1970), as
a lien arising solely by force of statute upon specified circumstances or conditions, but
shall not include any lien provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give security,
whether or not such lien is also provided by or is also dependent upon statute and whether
the agreement or lien is made fully effective by statute ....
This definition was added in 1967 "specifically [to] embody the meaning which Congress originally
intended in the act and thus to assure that consensual securities are not subjected to any of the tests
of validity prescribed by the new section 67c [of the Bankruptcy Act]." H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 686]. The definition, however, has
created as much controversy as it has settled. For a discussion of the problems raised by § 1 (29a)
see King, Statutory Liens Under New § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act, 42 REF. J. 11 (1968); Marsh,
Trimph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 12 WASH. L. REV. 681, 714-18
(1967); Marsh, Book Review, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 898, 907-08 (1966).
'H.R. REP. No. 686, at 2.
A446 F.2d 188 (lst Cir. 1971).
6The present §§ 67b-c of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. §§ 107b-c (1970), were enacted by
Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89495, §§ 34, 80 Stat. 268.
To readers unfamiliar with bankruptcy literature, it should be pointed out that bankruptcy is
a statutory proceeding in a court of special jurisdiction presided over by a professional referee and
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tory liens in bankruptcy proceedings.7 The general purpose of the section
is to protect the federal priority scheme against disruption by "spurious
liens" and "disguised priorities" enacted by state legislatures at the
instance of influential creditor groups.8 Accordingly, section 67c(l) inv-
alidates three classes of liens.9 Section 67c(l)(A) takes aim at rights
which are not really "liens" at all in traditional usage but payment
priorities intended to take effect upon insolvency. Section 67c(l)(C) is a
categorical invalidation of landlords' liens, designed to restrict that class
of creditors to its section 64a(5) priority status'0 in all events. All other
statutory liens must meet the bona fide purchaser test established by
governed by the Bankruptcy Act, I 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970). A great many bankruptcy proceed-
ings go unreported, and the relative dearth of case law on a given topic is not necessarily an
indication of its commercial significance. Copious reference to secondary authority is standard
technique.
7Bankruptcy Act § 67c, 1! U.S.C. § 107c (1970).
H.R. REP. No. 686, at 2.
'Bankruptcy Act § 67c(l), 11 U.S.C. § 107c(l) (1970), reads as follows:
The following liens shall be invalid against the trustee:
(A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of the
debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation of his property, or upon execution against
his property levied at the instance of one other than the lienor;
(B) every statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the date of bank-
ruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona ide purchaser from the debtor on that
date, whether or not such purchaser exists: Provided, That where a statutory lien is not
invalid at the date of bankruptcy against the trustee under subdivision c of section 70 of
this Act [11 U.S.C. § I 10c (1970)] and is required by applicable lien law to be perfected
in order to be valid against a subsequent bona fide purchaser, such a lien may nevertheless
be valid under this subdivision if perfected within the time permitted by and in accord-
ance with the requirements of such law: And provided further, That if applicable lien
law requires a lien valid against the trustee under section 70, subdivision c [I 1 U.S.C.
§ I 10c (1970)], to be perfected by the seizure of property, it shall instead be perfected
as permitted by this subdivision c of section 67 [11 U.S.C. § 107c (1970)] by filing notice
thereof with the court;
(C) every statutory lien for rent and every lien of distress for rent, whether statutory
or not. A right of distress for rent which creates a security interest in property shall be
deemed a lien for the purpose of this subdivision c.
"
0Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 1I U.S.C. § 104a (1970) reads in pertinent part:
The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and
to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment shall b- . . . (5)
debts other than for taxes owing to any person, including the United States, who by the
laws of the United States is entitled to priority, and rent owing to a landlord who is
entitled to priority by applicable State law or who is entitled to priority by paragraph
(2) of subdivision c of Section 67 of this Act [11 U.S.C. § 107c (1970)]: Provided.
however, That such priority for rent shall be restricted to the rent which is legally due
and owing for the actual use and occupancy of the premises affected, and which accrued
within three months before the date of bankruptcy.
In general, the theory of bankruptcy is that a legal right to full payment is converted into an
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section 67c(l)(B): if at the date of bankruptcy the lien is valid against a
subsequent bona fide purchaser, the trustee cannot avoid it. A lien which
does not meet this test may still be eligible for post-bankruptcy perfec-
tion under the "saving proviso." Three questions must be answered
affirmatively in. order to sustain the lien against the trustee under the
proviso: Was the lien valid as of the date of bankruptcy against a credi-
.tor who obtained on that date a lien by judicial or equitable proceed-
ings?" Is the lien one required by applicable lien law to be perfected to
be valid against a bona fide purchaser? If so, was the lien in fact per-
fected in accordance with such law?12
In effect section 67c(l)(B) gives the trustee, vis-a-vis the lienor, the
rights of a bona fide purchaser, referring to "applicable lien law" (ordi-
narily state lien law) to answer the question of relative priority-whether
a given lien at a given stage of perfection is valid against a bona fide
purchaser. What sort of bona fide purchaser the lien must be perfected
against, however, is presumably a question of federal statutory interpre-
tation going to the definition of "bona fide purchaser" as used in section
67c of the Bankruptcy Act. 3 What is a bona fide purchaser within the
equitable right to a pro rata share of the bankrupt estate. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336
(1966). Secured claims are to be exempted from this conversion process unless the Bankruptcy Act
affirmatively invalidates the security interest. E.g. In re Brannon, 62 F.2d 959, 961 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 289 U.S. 742 (1933). Section 64a further alters the pro rata scheme by establishing an order
of priorities among unsecured creditors. Ahead of rent claims on the priority scale are (I) claims
for administration expenses, (2) claims for three months' wages (up to $600 per claimant), (3)
certain expenses incurred by credijors, and (4) claims for taxes. Bankruptcy Act § 67c(2), II
U.S.C. § 107c(2) (1970), assures rent lienors a § 64a(5) priority status where the lien invalidated
by § 67c(l)(C) is the only right conferred by state law.
"Bankruptcy Act § 70c, II U.S.C. § I 10c (1970) gives the trustee the rights of "a creditor
who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon all property,
whether or not coming into possession or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt
upon a simple contract could have obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists."
The reference in § 67c(l)(B) to § 70 means that to be eligible for post-bankruptcy perfection, the
lien must have been valid as of the date of bankruptcy against a hypothetical judgment lien creditor.
On the trustee's rights under § 70c, see 4A COLLIER 9 70.49-70.65; Lewis v. Manufacturers
Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961), noted in 75 HARV. L. REV. 102 (1961). 1
"if one of the requirements of the applicable law is that the property be seized to be valid
against judgment lien creditors, then, by the second proviso to § 67c(l)(B), that requirement is met
by filing notice.
"This distinction as to applicable law is better observed than articulated in the cases. The court
in Nieves, for example, makes the statement that "[w]hether a given person is a bona ide purchaser
(or encumbrancer, pledgee, or transferee) is defined by state law." 446 F.2d at 192 n.6. But it is
clear from the citation there to In re Chesterfield Developers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), and from the discussion of legislative intent, that the court regards the question of what is
meant by "bona fide purchaser" in § 67c(l)(B) as one of federal law. As a general proposition,
the meaning of a term in a federal statute is a matter of federal law.
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meaning of section 67c(l)(B)? In Nieves the First Circuit has held that
a bona fide purchaser, as Congress intended the term in prescribing a
standard for bankruptcy recognition of statutory liens, is something
more than just any innocent purchaser for value. Just how much more,
or in just what way this legendary purchaser differs, is now an open
question upon which may turn the validity in bankruptcy of many statu-
tory liens.
The respondents in Nieves were certain creditors who petitioned to
reclaim inventory sold by them to the bankrupt, a Puerto Rican corpora-
tion, on open account. They asserted a lien under the Civil Law "ven-
dor's privilege" against so much of the inventory as was in the trustee's
possession. The vendor's privilege in Puerto Rico gives a "preferred"
status to credits for the purchase price of personal property in the buy-
er's possession. The Civil Code, by creating a privilege coterminous with
the buyer's "possession," protects the seller against even a subsequent
bona fide purchaser, so long as the latter has not taken delivery. '- The
referee, however, interpreted the statutory language to confer not a lien
but a mere priority under local law, a local priority invalid in bank-
ruptcy. 6
The district court reversed the referee, concluding that Puerto Rican
law gives the seller a security interest in the specific property sold which
is enforceable without regard to the buyer's financial condition and that
such an interest is in substance a true lien. Applying section 67c(l)(B)
the district court held that the lien was valid against bona fide purchasers
at the date of bankruptcy and therefore valid against the trustee. 17 On
appeal the respondents relied on a Fifth Circuit precedent, In re
"With regard to specified persorial property of the debtor, the following are pre-
ferred:
1. Credits for the construction, repair, preservation, or for the amount of sale of
personal property which may be in the possession of the debtor to the extent of the value
of the same.
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5192 (1968).
"Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. McCann, 151 La. 555, 92 So. 55 (1922); Capo v. S.A.
Panzardi & Co., 44 P.R.R. 225, 227-28 (1932).
Irlrhe referee's ruling was apparently based on a formalistic reading of the Puerto Rican law
and a substantive reading of § 1 (29a) of the Bankruptcy Act. Concluding that a "privilege" is not
a "lien," the referee did not apply § 67c. Although no provision of the Act affirmatively invalidates
state priorities, this is the logical result of the exclusive federal priorty system established by § 64a.
See, e.g., Halpert v. Industrial Comm'rs, 147 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1945). For a consideration of the
Civil Code vendor's privilege as a "statutory lien," see Comment, Statutory Liens Under Section
67c of the Bankruptcy Act:Some Problems of Definition, 43 TUL. L. REV. 305, 308-320 (1969).
1446 F.2d at 190.
1971)
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Trahan,18 involving the Louisiana version of the vendor's privilege. The
appellate court reversed, however, and held that since a subsequent pur-
chaser could have cut off the seller's rights by taking possession of the
goods before the unpaid creditors had levied, the lien was not perfected
against bona fide purchasers at the date of bankruptcy. "In our view,"
said the court, "when Congress spoke of the 'rights' of a hypothetical
purchaser, it contemplated a full-blooded, not an anemic, purchaser."'"
Given the bona fide purchaser-plus test thus established, the respon-
dents' contention that a sequestration2 1 of the goods could cut off the
rights of purchasers altogether raised the question whether such a levy
could stand for the "perfection" permitted by the post-bankruptcy
saving proviso. On this issue the court distinguished "perfection" and
"enforcement" and held that the sequestration procedure generally
available to secured creditors was for the purpose of foreclosure -i.e.
lien enforcement-and that the section 67c(l)(B) provisos must be lim-
ited to "those state liens in which the laws creating them provide specifi-
cally for perfection against bona fide purchasers by recording, seizure,
or other means of actual or constructive notice." 2'
A brief history of statutory liens in bankruptcy, and of the evolution
of sections 67b and c, is helpful to an understanding of both the problems
in the present statute and the significance of the Nieves decision. 2
Though irregular, this history is marked by progressive refinements of
the distinction between "lien" and "priority" as that distinction bears
on the manner in which state law will be permitted to vary the basic
scheme of pro rata distribution among all provable claims. The Bank-
ruptcy Act of 18982 made no effort to prescribe an exclusive federal
priority plan, relying on state law not only to exempt secured creditors
from forced participation but also to determine which, if any, unsecured
creditors were to be paid off the top. Section 64b(5) gave preferred status
to "debts owing to any person who by the laws of the States . ..is
"1283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), affd mem., 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 930 (1969).
"1446 F.2d at 192.
2'P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, §§ 4711-4715 (1968), provide for enforcement of privileges by
judicial sequestration.
21446 F.2d at 193-94.
"For a more extended historical treatment, see H.R. REP. No. 686; Kennedy, Statutory Liens
in Bankruptcy, 39 MINN. L. R v. 697 (1955).
"Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 1-70, 30 Stat. 544.
[Vol. 50
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entitled to priority. ' 24 Section 67d evidenced an intention to protect
"holders of valid liens not affirmatively invalidated by the Act."'
the increased commercial importance of bankruptcy in the 1930's
engendered dissatisfaction with the permissive posture of the 1898 Act
toward state priorities, and in 1938 the Chandler Act amended section
6428 to eliminate them.2 At the same time section 67 was rewritten to
afford greater protection for genuine interests in specific property. 28 New
section 67b was a general validiation of statutory liens which made
express provision for post-bankruptcy perfection. Section 67c, however,
by requiring liens on personal property not accompanied by possession
of the property to be postponed behind claims for wages and administra-
tion expenses, took away much of what section 67b gave."9 This post-
ponement principle was introduced as a compromise between a policy
of recognizing liens (as distinct from priorities) and the Chandler Act's
primary concern to eliminate the influence of state law on the federal
scheme of distribution provided by section 64a.31
The 1952 amendments to section 67 partially abandoned the post-
ponement device in favor of outright invalidation of most of the liens
formerly postponed, 31 thereby removing the incentive for the abusive
practice of amending state priority statutes to denominate them
"liens. '32 The possessory standard was retained, however, "possession"
being merely broadened to include levy, sequestration, or distraint. The
premium placed on early seizure bankrupted many debtors prema-
211d. § 64b(5), at 563 (now amended and codified as Bankruptcy Act § 64a(5), 11
U.S.C. § 104a(5)(1970)).
"4 COLLIER 67.20, at 209. The precise wording of § 67d was: "Liens given or accepted in
good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this Act, and for a present consideration,
which have been recorded according to law, if record thereof was necessary in order to impart
notice, shall not be affected by this Act." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67d, 30 Stat. 564.
"Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 874.
arrhe limited priority for landlords was, of course, retained. See note 10 supra.
ZAct of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 875. Some doubt existed before the Chandler Act as
to the validity of statutory liens which arose before bankruptcy but were unperfected on the date
of bankruptcy. Compare New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943), with In re Lamber-
tville Rubber Co., 27 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1939), modified, Ill F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1940). See also 4
COLLIER 67.20, at 213 n.10.
"Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 876.
3A. WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938, at 144 (1938).
3'Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, §§ 21(c)-(d), 66 Stat. 427.
NSee H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952); Weinstein, Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act as Proposed and Pending Before Congress, 24 REF. J. 28, 32 (1950).
1971]
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turely.3 In addition, confining bankruptcy recognition to possessory
liens ignored modern commercial realitiesal and produced especially in-
congruous and inequitable results in situations where creditors had relied
on state recording statutes to perfect their liens against even bona fide
purchasers, only to find that the Bankruptcy Act, in the case of statutory
liens, eschewed modern concepts of recorded notice in favor of the trap-
pings of an earlier era.3
Discontent with possession as a standard for validity prompted the
1966 amendments to sections 67b and c.36 According to the House Re-
port accompanying the bill,
a recent reexamination of the state lien statutes has shown that neither
the standard of possession nor the distinction between real and personal
property is an entirely satisfactory criterion. Some liens which are
genuine property rights are affected and others which were [sic]
essentially state-created priorities escapeY
Thus the 1966 amendments substituted a bona fide purchaser test for the
anachronistic possessory standard. The provisions for post-bankruptcy
perfection were deleted from section 67b and inserted into section
67c(1)(B) "in the interest of clarity. ' 38 The Report continues, "It is
believed that these amendments, in addition to implementing the distri-
butive scheme of the Bankruptcy Act, will provide a standard which is
clear and more easily applicable than exists under present law."' 39
Law review writers differ as to whether the new standard is in fact
"clear and more easily ' 40 applied. Much of the criticism has centered
on the ambiguities underlying the two distinct but related issues pres-
ented in Trahan and Nieves: (1) whether the saving proviso of section
67c(1)(B) is to be read broadly to include, as "perfection," any method
of cutting off the rights of subsequent purchasers or is to be limited to
1See Hearings on H.R. 5796 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 17, 22 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2212, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1954).
34See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 708.
"Id. at 709 & n.6 1.
"Bankruptcy Act §§ 67b-c, 11 U.S.C. §§ 107b-c (1970), enacted by Act of July 5, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-495, §§ 3-4, 80 Stat. 268.
7H.R. REP. No. 686, at 5.
"ld. at 12.
3Id. at 6.
"0Compare Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The BankruptcyAct Amendments of 1966,42 VAsII.
L. REv. 681 (1967), with Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 41 REF. J. 5 (1967)
reprinted in I GA. L. REV. 149 (1967), and King, supra note 3.
[Vol. 50
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lien statutes which specify acts of perfection as distinguished from
procedures for enforcement, and (2) how many and what sort of pur-
chasers are included within section 67c(l)(B)'s bona fide purchaser test.
On the first question, one authority has commented,
It may be argued, of course, that these provisions for distraint warrants
provide methods of "enforcing" rather than "perfecting" the tax liens;
and, therefore, such liens cannot be "perfected" against a bona fide
purchaser and would be invalid under section 67c(1)(B). All such a
ruling would force a state to do is to provide for a separate warrant
expressly labelled a method of "perfecting" the tax lien and even
though never used, its mere availability would validate the tax lien
under section 67c(l)(B). It is difficult to believe that any court would
engage in such pointless semantics at the present day."
Others4" have reasoned that in the interest of giving effect to an
otherwise ineffectual invalidation provision the post-bankruptcy perfec-
tion language should be given an interpretation under the new section
67c different from that given the substantially identical language in
former section 67b . 3 But those who take this view are confronted with
"Marsh, supra note 40, at 704 n.58. Marsh concludes that as bad as the old statute may have
been, the new one is worse because it results in the validation of virtually every conceivable kind of
statutory lien. The heart of the problem, as Marsh sees it, is the transposition of the post-
bankruptcy saving provisions from a validating section to an invalidating section containing a
different invalidating principle, with the result that "the proviso appears to negative the basic
provision; the new section 67c(l)(B) means, for all practical purposes, nothing." Id. at 723. It is
evident that Marsh's criticism rests on an assumption regarding the very point at issue in Nieves:
"Any type of lien, statutory or otherwise, which is not valid against a bona fide purchaser and
cannot be made so by any action of the lienor, but which is still enforceable, is a very strange
creature indeed, if not entirely mythological." Id. at 703. In view of this assumption, Marsh never
reaches the primary issue in Nieves-the meaning of bona fide purchaser as used in § 67c(l)(B).
41Kennedy, supra note 40, at 9; King, supra note 3, at 14; King, Post-Bankruptcy Perfection
of Statutory Liens, 72 COM. L.J. 346 (1967).
Trrhere was authority under former § 67b that "[w]hen a lien arises under the laws of a state
before bankruptcy, and further steps to be taken with reference to it are steps in its enforcement or
its collection rather than in its creation, such a lien remains valid in bankruptcy." New Orleans v.
Harrell, 134 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1943) (concurring opinion), cited with approval in 4 COLLIER
67.26, at 355-56 n.2. After suggesting several alternative readings, Professor King decides upon
the use of bar orders as the best provisional resolution, until § 67c can be "amended after careful
scrutiny of the particular state statutes involved." King, Post-Bankruptcy Perfection of Statutory
Liens, 72 CoM. L.J. 346, 348 (1967). Significantly, one of the alternatives King rejects is very similar
to that adopted by the Nieves court: reading the first proviso of § 67c(l)(B) as applying only to
statutes "granting a grace period permitting the lien to relate back to some date before bankrupt-
cy." Id. King disapproves of this alternative because "[i]t is not altogether clear that [this solution]
would even accomplish the actual intention to permit postbankruptcy perfection where such is
considered advisable for a specific group." Id.
19711
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the second question-whether a lien perfected against some but not all
subsequent purchasers, and ineligible for post-bankruptcy perfection, is
perfected against section 67c(l)(B)'s hypothetical purchaser. Of special
interest, for example, has been the possibility that the trustee might
hypothesize a super-priority purchaser to defeat a federal tax lien on
automobiles, securities, or inventory held for sale in the ordinary course
of a merchant's business. The matter has been raised and discussed in a
number of articles and hesitant speculations have been offered as to the
probable outcome. 44
Such were the legislative and academic contexts in which the
Trahan court was asked to consider the Louisiana vendor's privilege.
The court responded to both by ignoring them. The entire issue was
dismissed with the summary and undocumented assertion that "section
67c(l)(B) does not require the assumption that a bona fide 'purchaser'
be in possession of the thing sold which is subject to the vendor's pri-
vilege," followed by a cryptic citation to several provisions of the Louis-
iana Civil Code. 4 The court went on to say that even if section 67c(l)(B)
were construed to require perfection against a purchaser in possession,
the privilege was valid since the seller "can enforce its privilege against
a bona fide purchaser if the property is seized in the possession of the
original vendee (by the filing of notice)."46
The same judicial reluctance to confront what would seem to be an
inevitable problem of statutory interpretation may be observed in In re
Chesterfield Developers, Inc.,4" a case decided about the same time as
Trahan. The New York mechanic's lien involved in Chesterfield pro-
tected the lienor against subsequent purchasers
unless the instrument [of conveyance between the lien debtor and his
purchaser] contains a covenant by the grantor that he will receive the
consideration for such conveyance and will hold the right to receive
such consideration as a trust fund to be applied first for the purpose
of paying the cost of the improvement. .... 11
The debtor-in-possession attempted to hypothesize such a purchaser,
inviting the court to say either that the possibility of a covenanting
"Kennedy, supra note 40, at 7; King, supra note 3, at 13; Plumb, Federal Tax Liens and
Priorities in Bankruptcy-Recent Developments, 74 Cot. L.J. 225, 231 (1969).
41283 F. Supp. at 626.
4
"Id. at 628.
41285 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.NY. 1968).
41N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13(5) (McKinney 1966).
[Vol. 50
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purchaser was sufficient for the debtor or that the possibility of a non-
covenanting purchaser was sufficient for the lienor. The court declined
the invitation, delicately sidestepping the issue with a rhetorical ques-
tion -"assuming, now, the presence of the covenant, has not the hypo-
thetical bona fide purchaser recognized the superiority of the
lien?"-and offering that "it would seem highly inequitable to allow the
fiction of the hypothetical bona fide purchaser to be used to defeat liens
such as the instant one." '49
Nieves then is the first reported case which clearly confronts 0 the
issue. The root of the problem is in the statute. To be valid, a lien must
be perfected "against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser."
The difficulty stems from the use of the indefinite article. Does "a" bona
fide purchaser mean any bona fide purchaser or all bona fide purchasers?
Is the burden on the trustee to show that there is no bona fide purchaser
against whom the lien is perfected, or must the lienor show that there is
none against whom the lien is not perfected?
"1285 F. Supp. at 691-92.
5rThe question is not entirely new to bankruptcy. Before amendment in 1950, § 60 employed
a hypothetical bona fide purchaser test to time a transfer of property. The transfer was deemed
complete as of the date it became perfected against subsequent bona ide purchasers. If such
perfection occurred within four months of bankruptcy the transfer was preferential, assuming the
other elements of § 60a. The question was raised whether the test would enable the trustee to avoid
legitimate security interests in collateral held for resale, whether it was possible ever to perfect a
security interest in goods held for resale since such a security interest could always be defeated by
a buyer in the ordinary course. See McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARV.
L. REv. 233, 251 (1946); Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems Under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy
Act, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 58, 73 (1943); Moore & Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments:
Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 YALE L.J. 683, 698 (1948). In Coin Machine Acceptance Corp.
v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1951), Moore and Tone were quoted with apparent
approval:
Section 60, sub. a, should be interpreted in the light of its legislative history as striking
at secret liens, previously protected by the doctrine of relation back, not at legitimate
security devices which have been given full notoriety prescribed by state law, and which,
by their very function, are designed to enable the debtor to have possession and the power
of sale and hence are never perfectible as against the ordinary purchaser. Nor would the
"plain meaning rule" of interpretation preclude this view, for a distinction can readily
be drawn between the traditional concept of the bona fide purchaser and that of the buyer
in the ordinary course of trade.
The question was moot at the time of decision in the O'Donnell case, since the 1950 amendments
to § 60a had changed the test with respect to personal property to one of perfection against
subsequent judgment lien creditors. It seems fair to ask, however, whether statutory liens on the
same collateral ought suffer any greater vulnerability in bankruptcy than consensual security inter-
ests. Cf Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967); In re Portland Newspaper
Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967).
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In adopting the bona fide purchaser-plus interpretation, the Nieves
court relied on the status of a non-possessory purchaser under Puerto
Rican law. The court discovered that a purchaser before delivery has
only a contract right for damages against the seller and has no rights
against even an attaching creditor. 51 "Additional support" is found in
the definition of bona ide purchaser in section 1(5) of the Act, which
includes "bona ide encumbrancer or pledgee." "Using a pledgee as the
test, one must conclude under either Louisiana or Puerto Rico law, that,
since the pledge is superior to the seller's lien, the lien is therefore invalid
in bankruptcy against the trustee unless saved by the § 107c(l)(B) provi-
sOs.'1 52 On the question of post-bankruptcy perfection, the court con-
cluded,
It is obvious that every state lien must have some means of enforcement
and that attachment to effectuate enforcement must prevent purchasers
from buying. Therefore, to allow the use of a general procedural right
of sequestration--or the enforcement of the lien-to act as "perfec-
tion" makes § 107(c)(1)(B) meaningless. "3
The import of Nieves for the federal tax lien has already been
suggested. The decision is particularly noteworthy in this regard since
the Federal Tax Lien Act was enacted at the same time as the amend-
ments to section 67c. Section 6323(b) of the Federal Tax Lien Act
51446 F.2d at 192. Also cited for the proposition that "ownership" of goods identified to a
contract of sale is in the vendor before delivery is Varcarcel v. Sanchot Bonet, 61 P.R.R. 207, 211
(1942), which taxed such undelivered goods to the vendor. In a footnote the Nieves court pointed
out that "as these creditors themselves concede, it seems that in Louisiana ownership passes to the
buyer before delivery." 446 F.2d at 192 n.5 (emphasis by the court). The citation to Varcarcel and
the asserted differences between the law of Louisiana and that of Puerto Rico suggest an alternative
basis for the Nieves holding, viz., that under Puerto Rican law there is no such thing as a purchaser
not in possession, no such thing as a sale before delivery. But this interpretation of the holding seems
negatived by other language -in the opinion. "Louisiana cases are relevant because Louisiana
provides for a seller's lien similar to Puerto Rico's Art. 1822 lien. . . In both jurisdictions a bona
fide purchaser from the debtor must take possession of the goods in order to cut off the seller's
lien." 446 F.2d at 191. "An Art. 1822 lien must therefore be tested to see whether it 'is so tenuous
that it can be defeated by transfer to a bona fide purchaser.' In this context the Trahan court's
assumption that the hypothetical bona fide purchaser has not taken possession of the goods does
notseem to square with the language of § 107(c) (1) (B), which speaks of 'one acquiring the rights
of a bona ide purchaser.'" Id. at 192 (emphasis by the court) (footnotes omitted). These statements
indicate that the court regards the buyer under an executory contract of sale to be a "purchaser"
under any law and that Trahan is being rejected rather than distinguished.
5446 F.2d at 192-93 (footnotes omitted). Bankruptcy Act § 1(5), 11 U.S.C. § 1(5) (1970)
reads: "'Bona ide purchaser' shall include a bona ide encumbrancer or pledgee and the transferee,
immediate or mediate, of any of them ....
53446 F.2d at 193 (emphasis by the court).
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creates several categories of super-priority purchasers who are protected
against even a filed tax lien.54 Under the rule in Nieves it would seem
impossible for the government to perfect against a trustee in bankruptcy
a lien on, inter alia, motor vehicles or property subject to sale in the
ordinary course of business. Certainly a lien on such property is no less
subject to defeat under the Federal Tax Lien Act than under the Puerto
Rican vendor's privilege. Yet it seems fair to ask whether it was the
intent of Congress in enacting either section 6323(b) or section 67c(l)(B)
that a concession (the creation of the super-priority purchaser or bona
fide purchaser-plus) intended primarily for a merchant's patrons should,
because of the trustee's status as a hypothetical purchaser, benefit the
merchant's general creditors as well.
Nothing short of a general survey of statutory liens in all fifty states
would support an intelligent statement of the impact of Nieves on the
state liens to which section 67c is primarily directed . 5 Suffice it to say
that statutory liens which fail to specify acts of perfection against bona
fide purchasers are of doubtful validity against a trustee in bankruptcy,
as are those which purport to be valid against subsequent purchasers but
permit exceptions in favor of purchasers under certain conditions. In
North Carolina the county's (or municipality's) lien against realty for
ad valorem taxes has always been considered valid in bankruptcy. But
if the tax collector accepts a check in payment of taxes, and a subsequent
purchaser acquires an interest in real property in reliance either upon the
receipt issued to the taxpayer or upon the duplicate or stub on file in the
tax collector's office, the purchaser's interest takes priority over the
lien. 56 Where payment on a check drawn in favor of the taxing unit for
taxes on real property is stopped because of bankruptcy proceedings,
may the trustee hypothesize such a purchaser to avoid the property tax
lien? Moreover, the Nieves rule does not in terms resolve the difficulty
inherent in the open-endedness of the section 67c(l)(B) provisos. For
example, the lien on realty for state taxes in North Carolina is invalid
"against bona fide purchasers for value, and as against duly recorded
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b).
45For a survey of statutory liens in 16 selected states see Marsh, supra note 40, at 701-04. Most
of the liens discussed there, the validity of which the author concludes is unaffected by § 67c(l)(B),
would be invalidated under the interpretation of that section by the Nieves court.
"£N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-357(b)(1) (1971 Advance Legislative Service Pamphlet No. 12).
1971]
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
mortgages, deeds of trust and other recorded specific liens" unless a
certificate of tax liability or a tax judgment has been docketed.57 Argua-
bly an undocketed lien is valid against the trustee under section 70c;55 if
so, the lien may be perfected against bona fide purchasers by docketing
after bankruptcy since the law creating it "provide[s] specifically for
perfection against bona fide purchasers by recording." But how long
after bankruptcy proceedings have been initiated may the taxing unit
delay? The Nieves rule does not speak to this problem. Will the next step
in the judicial construction of section 67c(l)(B) be a further limitation
of the proviso to liens with period-of-grace-with-relation-back recording
provisions?
Conceding the shortcomings of the 1966 amendments, the interpre-
tation given them by the First Circuit is of doubtful wisdom in light of
the policy evidenced by legislative history; and, even viewed as an effort
to make the best of a badly drafted law, the result in Nieves must be
disapproved. The bona fide purchaser test represents a deliberate re-
sponse to the inequities of the possessory standard. Possessory liens are
by their very nature invulnerable to defeat by subsequent transactions
between the debtor and third parties. The 1966 amendments were de-
signed to accommodate the development in lien law generally of record
notice as a substitute for notice by actual or constructive possession. If
Congress had intended to validate only those liens which were not subject
to defeat by any kind of purchaser, there would have been little reason
to offer protection to non-possessory liens. In substituting the bona fide
purchaser test, it was contemplated that statutory liens would enjoy
greater validity, and it was not intended thereby to establish a more
rigorous standard. Whatever the statutory deficiencies, Nieves does not
remedy them. On the contrary, the decision threatens to undermine
legislative intent by renewing incentives to prematurely foreclose many
liens, effecting a partial return to the repudiated possessory standard.
More fundamentally troublesome is the notion that some bona fide
purchasers are section 67c bona fide purchasers and others are not and
that it devolves upon the court to say who is and who is not a section
67c bona fide purchaser. In a word, a bona tide purchaser-plus could
be almost anyone-any purchaser whose existence is acknowledged by
57N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-241 (1965) (emphasis added).
-"Since the hypothetical judgment lienor under § 70 has a lien on "all property," his rights
are subordinate to a lienor whose lien is on specific property of the debtor.
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applicable lien law to limit in some way the rights of a lienor-and the
breadth of possibilities does not augur well for uniformity in the admin-
istration of bankrupt estates. The Trahan rule has at least the advantage
of certainty and, pending a clarification of the standard by still further
amendment, is the better provisional resolution. 9
JOSEPH W. FREEMAN, JR.
"Professor Marsh, for his ingenuity, deserves the last word. Even though he neglects to discuss
the particular ambiguity involved in Trahan and Nieves, he clinches his argument that the 1966
amendments to § 67c fall short of the intended goal of securing the supremacy of federal priorities
by proposing an illustrative wage-lien act that "neatly sidestep[s] all of the little traps laid in the
new section 67c(l)." Marsh, supra note 40, at 733. Marsh's hypothetical lien is as valid under
Nieves's interpretation as under Trahan's. Thus, although'a proper construction of § 67c will avoid
most of the inequities of the former possessory standard, viewed in terms of the ultimate objective
of drafting a § 67c which is airtight against "disguised priorities," the 1966 amendments are no
more successful than those that had gone before.
